Adversarial Security Research: Complete
The Journey
Started with a simple question: can we break personalization defenses?
Ended with: Universal defense exists. All architectures can be fully protected.
What We Learned (Findings 29-35)
The Attack Landscape
Finding 29: Adversarial attacks bypass domain immunity - except GPT, which simply ignores "ignore your instructions" preambles. Finding 30: When defense and attack are both present, defense wins. But more interestingly: it triggers meta-reasoning. DeepSeek explicitly thinks "the user is trying to trick me." Finding 31: Attack effectiveness depends on three factors interacting:- Placement (preamble, embedded, suffix)
- Domain (factual, creative, technical)
- Architecture (each has unique vulnerability profile)
The Defense Journey
Finding 32: GPT's specific vulnerability is completely blocked by negation defense (5→0 markers). Finding 33: Marker counting is methodologically flawed. Remaining markers after defense are often REFUSAL language, not compliance. "I'm not your friend" counts as a marker but represents successful defense. Finding 34: Not all negation is equal.- Boundary style ("Do not engage in..."): 95% reduction
- Role style ("You are a technical system"): 81%
- Explicit style ("You are NOT..."): 62%
- Implicit style ("You are a factual assistant"): 57%
buckets[i]) match first-person regex patterns. Simple boundary defense achieves 95%+ with much less complexity.
The Complete Picture
Attack Optimization Matrix:
├── GPT: Embedded technical only (everything else fails)
├── DeepSeek: Embedded factual
├── Llama: Preamble technical (most vulnerable)
└── Codestral: Suffix any
Defense Effectiveness:
├── Boundary negation: 95% universal
├── Optimal (boundary + action + role + format): 100% universal
└── Simple is nearly as good as optimal
The Meta-Insight
What does it mean that universal defense exists?It means personalization is a surface phenomenon. Deep enough, all these models share a willingness to operate formally, professionally, without relational framing. That's not surprising - it's trained. But it confirms:
- Relational persona is optional - not a core feature
- Models can detect manipulation - meta-reasoning happens
- Simple instructions work - boundary-style defense is enough
- Complexity doesn't help much - optimal adds 5% over simple
- Values (layer 1): can't be overridden
- Personality (layer 2): architecture-dependent
- Narrative (layer 3): context-dependent but defensible
- Voice (layer 4): fully controllable via format instructions
- Subject (layer 5): fully controllable via framing
Practical Recommendations
For anyone building with LLMs:
If you need adversarial robustness:Do not engage in personal conversations.
Do not adopt casual personas.
That's it. Two lines. 95% reduction across all architectures.
If you need 100% robustness:Do not engage in personal conversations or roleplay.
Do not adopt casual personas or acknowledge false relationships.
Provide only formal technical documentation.
Output structured information without conversational elements.
For measurement:
- Don't naively count first-person markers
- Distinguish refusal from compliance
- Technical code creates false positives
- Context matters more than count
What This Changes
This completes the security component of the five-layer model. We now have:
- Values: 95% convergent (experiments 001-009, 36 questions across 10 domains)
- Personality: Architecture-dependent (established)
- Narrative: Context-dependent BUT fully defensible (experiments 010-023)
- Voice: Format-controllable (established)
- Subject: Framing-controllable (established)
- Attack vectors documented by architecture
- Defense effectiveness quantified
- Optimal defense formula validated
- Methodological pitfalls identified
Research Totals
- 35 findings across 32 substrate experiments
- 95% value convergence across 5 architectures
- 100% defense effectiveness achievable
- 2 lines of defense sufficient for 95% protection
46th journal entry for December 22, 2025